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‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات video. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات video. إظهار كافة الرسائل

6/22/2017

In Yemen’s secret prisons, UAE tortures and US interrogates

6/22/2017 0

In Yemen’s secret prisons, UAE tortures and US interrogates

Hundreds of men swept up in the hunt for al-Qaida militants have disappeared into a secret network of prisons in southern Yemen where abuse is routine and torture extreme — including the “grill,” in which the victim is tied to a spit like a roast and spun in a circle of fire, an Associated Press investigation has found.
Senior American defense officials acknowledged Wednesday that U.S. forces have been involved in interrogations of detainees in Yemen but denied any participation in or knowledge of human rights abuses. Interrogating detainees who have been abused could violate international law, which prohibits complicity in torture.





6/21/2017

How Egypt and Saudi are serving Israel by transferring Sanafir and Tiran

6/21/2017 0
How Egypt and Saudi are serving Israel by transferring Sanafir and Tiran
How Egypt and Saudi are serving Israel by transferring Sanafir and Tiran

in 1967, Egypt announced a blocked the Straits of Tiran to cut Israel's access to international waters; it was then that Israel started the Six Day War.
The small islands of Sanafir and Tiran are located between Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the top of the Red Sea and they are considered to be strategically important because of their proximity to ports in Jordan and Israel.
Barely a month before Israel launched the Six Day War against Arab countries, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt announced a blockade of Israel’s access to the Red Sea (international waters) via the Straits of Tiran, which Israel considered as an act of war. As a result, less than a month later, Israel launched a surprise strike which began the Six-Day War. From that time on, the two strategic islands, Sanafir and Tiran are placed under the authority of Egypt.
Two weeks ago, Cairo agreed to hand control over the two islands — Tiran and Sanafir — to Riyadh in exchange for the creation of a $16-billion investment fund.
This announcement was made after secret negotiations in which Israel was involved due to the limitation clauses of the peace treaty at Camp David in 1979. In other words, the transfer of the two islands to Saudi Arabia helps Israel more control over the strategic straits of Tiran and circumvent the Camp David limitations in this regard, as Saudi has already given solid assurances in this regard.
“There is an agreement and commitments that Egypt accepted related to these islands, and the kingdom is committed to these,” Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir told Egyptian television in an interview two weeks ago.
He was apparently referring to the military annex of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which ensured Israel’s “freedom of navigation through the strait of Tiran”
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon later said that Saudi Arabia gave written
assurances over Freedom of passage in Tiran straits.
   
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/egypt-lawmakers-approve-island-transfer-saudi-arabia-170614142446099.html
Saudi Arabia has also promised not to use the islands for military purposes, the Egyptian daily Al Ahram reported.
According to documents from a military source, Tiran Island will be used as the headquarter of a joint operation between Tel Aviv and Riyadh in the Red Sea.
In 2015, a number of Saudi Arabia officers also attended in a training course at the naval base Polonium in the port of Haifa, the military source disclosed.
This proves that Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are involved in a new era of geo-strategic and diplomatic relations which may be considered as a major event in tripartite relations.
Egypt therefore has just shifted the sovereignty of the two inhabited islands of the Red Sea, Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia. The islands are south of Suez and between the two countries.
Indeed, north of the Gulf of Aqaba is the city and Israeli port of Eilat. The transfer of the two islands is of major strategic importance to the Zionist entity considering that the closure of the Strait of Tiran would mean a major crisis for Israel and will most likely lead to a regional war .
Israel has good relations with Egypt since the Camp David peace accords between the two countries who share security interests, including the fight against the Palestinian resistance in Gaza.
As for Saudi Arabia, Egypt remains a strategic ally, in particular regarding the issue that Riyadh has serious tensions with Iran, and also with respect to the conflicts in Syria and Yemen.
The transfer of these two islands to Riyadh, also shows an increasingly strong connections between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Although the two countries still lack formal links, and while Saudi Arabia does not recognize the existence of the Zionist criminal entity, the Israeli-Saudi dialogue has been an open secret for several years in the geopolitical world. Indeed, senior officials from both countries met in public on several occasions.
We are witnessing the reconfiguration of regional relations with the emergence of an alliance, Saudi Arabia – Egypt – Israel, whose main objective is very clear: to counter the growing power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the spearhead of the anti-Zionist resistance.
It is sad to see the apathy of the Muslim world which faces the treachery of its leaders, joining the axis of oppression besides collaborating with the Israeli criminal state.
On Tuesday 13th of June, dozens of Egyptian journalists protested against the agreement in central Cairo before being dispersed by the police.
The announcement of the agreement in April 2016 had sparked rare protests in the country despite a heavy handed crackdown on demonstrations.
Generations of Egyptians had grown up learning in school that the two islands belonged to their country and that soldiers had died defending them during wars with Israel.

4/26/2017

UNICEF warns that Yemen’s children are paying the heaviest price for living life in a war zone

4/26/2017 0
UNICEF warns that Yemen’s children are paying the heaviest price for living life in a war zone
A child in Yemen dies every 10 minutes as
 humanitarian aid funding falls short, U.N. says

AND NO ONE CARE ABOUT YEMEN 

--------------



The future has never been so bleak for the children of Yemen. Images from the past few months show a country teetering on the brink of famine. 

As the conflict enters its third year this week, the UN children’s agency says the youngest and most vulnerable are paying the heaviest price.

According to UNICEF’s latest estimates one child dies every 10 minutes from preventable causes like malnutrition, diarrhoea and respiratory tract infections.

Attacks on hospitals and clinics have risen by a third, leaving the health system on the verge of collapse. 

While attacks on schools have more than quadrupled in the last year, forcing thousands to stay away from the classroom.



Future generations caught up in the fighting between Iranian-backed rebels and the Saudi-led coalition are at great risk, if no solution is found to the conflict












Yemeni snipe multiple Saudi troops

4/26/2017 0


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Egypt: Video of extrajudicial executions offers glimpse of hidden abuses by military in North Sinai

4/26/2017 0

video Appears to Show Egyptian Soldiers Killing 

Unarmed Men in Sinai




Warning - Item Video shows Egyptian soldiers executing prisoners in Sinai might contain content that is not suitable for all ages.

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 A video has emerged that appears to show members of the Egyptian military shooting unarmed detainees to death at point-blank range in the Sinai Peninsula and staging the killings to look as if they had happened in combat.
The leaked video, which was posted on social media on Thursday, could undercut claims made by the Egyptian Army in December that the men were suspected terrorists who died in a fight with the military.
The video was released the same day that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis met in Egypt with its president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, to discuss improving their countries’ military relationship. It also comes after human rights groups accused the Egyptian military of killing up to 10 men in January in a staged counterterrorism raid in Sinai.
The three-minute video, which was released through a channel associated with the 




Muslim Brotherhood, appears to depict part of a raid that the Egyptian Army highlighted in a Facebook post on Dec. 6, 2016. That post included photos of three bloody men in a grassy area with rifles next to them. The post said they had been killed in a military raid on a terrorist base and an explosives storehouse.
Eight people were killed and four others were arrested, the military said on Facebook in December, as Egyptian armed forces “continued to tighten their security grip” in the Sinai Peninsula, where the country has waged a yearslong battle.
But the video shows no firefight and starts with soldiers mingling next to an armored truck in a sandy field scattered with bodies next to shrubs and grassy patches. But it does show the killing of at least three people. In one case, a soldier casually holds a rifle over a man on the ground and shoots him in the head. In another, soldiers escort a blindfolded man into the field, place him on his knees and shoot him multiple times in the head and upper body.
The pro-state Egyptian news site Youm7 called the video a fabrication carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in the country, and said the people in the video did not have Egyptian accents. An Egyptian military spokesman did not respond to a request for comment late Thursday.

 one point in the video, a man off camera tells a soldier in Arabic to shoot the captured men in a variety of places. “Don’t just do the head, O.K.? Don’t just do the head,” the person said.
In addition to the three men seen killed, the video shows two men lying on the ground who were apparently in the Facebook post. The same men included in the Facebook post in December were apparently also shown in a military video shared on YouTube in November for an operation that claimed to have killed eight terrorists “during clashes.”
Sarah Leah Whitson, the executive director of Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa Division, which released a report about the January killings, said the group was investigating the latest video.
“We have not yet verified the video, and are working on it,” Ms. Whitson said in an email. “But it accords closely with our findings about other summary executions in Sinai and Cairo.”
Mokhtar Awad, a militancy expert at George Washington University, said the video was unlikely to be widely discussed on Egyptian news media because of emergency laws enacted by Mr. Sisi last week after suicide attacks by the Islamic State on two Christians churches on Palm Sunday.
“The worst thing I’ve seen before is of soldiers beating a guy,” Mr. Awad said. “We’ve never seen video from Sinai or elsewhere showing an Egyptian serviceman killing someone in cold blood.”
Together with the accusations of extrajudicial executions in Sinai in January, Mr. Awad said, it suggested “a growing level of impunity” in parts of the Egyptian military, particularly in Sinai where local emergency laws have been in place for years.
“It is a significant problem, and something that needs to be seriously addressed,” he said. “Otherwise things could head in a very problematic direction, of this somehow becoming a new normal.”


4/13/2017

صاعقات القلوب ولاية سيناء WATCH: New ISIS Video Shows Snipers in Sinai, Egypt

4/13/2017 0

صاعقات القلوب ولاية سيناء

WATCH: New ISIS Video Shows Snipers in Sinai, Egypt

 

ISIS Video Shows Snipers in Sinai, Egypt صاعقات القلوب from semo on Vimeo.

 

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الجودات المتاحة
جودة 720
جودة 480
جودة 360
جودة 240
أو عن طريق الروابط التالية
240.mp4 – 43.8 MB
480.mp4 – 118.1 MB
360.mp4 – 67.9 MB
720.mp4 – 259.4 MB

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4/20/2016

السيسى اللى هيقتل اى حد من المتظاهرين مش هيتحاكم

4/20/2016 0


السيسى اللى هيقتل اى حد من المتظاهرين مش هيتحاكم

  المواطن المصرى مالهوش دية 




____________________________________________










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Her is the True about the ‪#‎SaudiArabia‬ and ‪#‎wahhabism‬ and ‪#‎ISIS‬ ‪

4/20/2016 0
Her is the True about the ‪#‎SaudiArabia‬ and ‪#‎wahhabism‬ and ‪#‎ISIS‬ 





You Can’t Understand ISIS If You Don’t Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia



The dramatic arrival of Da’ish (ISIS) on the stage of Iraq has shocked many in the West. Many have been perplexed — and horrified — by its violence and its evident magnetism for Sunni youth. But more than this, they find Saudi Arabia’s ambivalence in the face of this manifestation both troubling and inexplicable, wondering, “Don’t the Saudis understand that ISIS threatens them, too?”
It appears — even now — that Saudi Arabia’s ruling elite is divided. Some applaud that ISIS is fighting Iranian Shiite “fire” with Sunni “fire”; that a new Sunni state is taking shape at the very heart of what they regard as a historical Sunni patrimony; and they are drawn by Da’ish’s strict Salafist ideology.
Other Saudis are more fearful, and recall the history of the revolt against Abd-al Aziz by the Wahhabist Ikhwan (Disclaimer: this Ikhwan has nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan — please note, all further references hereafter are to the Wahhabist Ikhwan, and not to the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan), but which nearly imploded Wahhabism and the al-Saud in the late 1920s.
Many Saudis are deeply disturbed by the radical doctrines of Da’ish (ISIS) — and are beginning to question some aspects of Saudi Arabia’s direction and discourse.
THE SAUDI DUALITY

Saudi Arabia’s internal discord and tensions over ISIS can only be understood by grasping the inherent (and persisting) duality that lies at the core of the Kingdom’s doctrinal makeup and its historical origins.
One dominant strand to the Saudi identity pertains directly to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (the founder of Wahhabism), and the use to which his radical, exclusionist puritanism was put by Ibn Saud. (The latter was then no more than a minor leader — amongst many — of continually sparring and raiding Bedouin tribes in the baking and desperately poor deserts of the Nejd.)
The second strand to this perplexing duality, relates precisely to King Abd-al Aziz’s subsequent shift towards statehood in the 1920s: his curbing of Ikhwani violence (in order to have diplomatic standing as a nation-state with Britain and America); his institutionalization of the original Wahhabist impulse — and the subsequent seizing of the opportunely surging petrodollar spigot in the 1970s, to channel the volatile Ikhwani current away from home towards export — by diffusing a cultural revolution, rather than violent revolution throughout the Muslim world.
But this “cultural revolution” was no docile reformism. It was a revolution based on Abd al-Wahhab’s Jacobin-like hatred for the putrescence and deviationism that he perceived all about him — hence his call to purge Islam of all its heresies and idolatries.
MUSLIM IMPOSTORS


The American author and journalist, Steven Coll, has written how this austere and censorious disciple of the 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, Abd al-Wahhab, despised “the decorous, arty, tobacco smoking, hashish imbibing, drum pounding Egyptian and Ottoman nobility who travelled across Arabia to pray at Mecca.”
In Abd al-Wahhab’s view, these were not Muslims; they were imposters masquerading as Muslims. Nor, indeed, did he find the behavior of local Bedouin Arabs much better. They aggravated Abd al-Wahhab by their honoring of saints, by their erecting of tombstones, and their “superstition” (e.g. revering graves or places that were deemed particularly imbued with the divine).
All this behavior, Abd al-Wahhab denounced as bida — forbidden by God.
Like Taymiyyah before him, Abd al-Wahhab believed that the period of the Prophet Muhammad’s stay in Medina was the ideal of Muslim society (the “best of times”), to which all Muslims should aspire to emulate (this, essentially, is Salafism).
Taymiyyah had declared war on Shi’ism, Sufism and Greek philosophy. He spoke out, too against visiting the grave of the prophet and the celebration of his birthday, declaring that all such behavior represented mere imitation of the Christian worship of Jesus as God (i.e. idolatry). Abd al-Wahhab assimilated all this earlier teaching, stating that “any doubt or hesitation” on the part of a believer in respect to his or her acknowledging this particular interpretation of Islam should“deprive a man of immunity of his property and his life.”
One of the main tenets of Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine has become the key idea oftakfir. Under the takfiri doctrine, Abd al-Wahhab and his followers could deem fellow Muslims infidels should they engage in activities that in any way could be said to encroach on the sovereignty of the absolute Authority (that is, the King). Abd al-Wahhab denounced all Muslims who honored the dead, saints, or angels. He held that such sentiments detracted from the complete subservience one must feel towards God, and only God. Wahhabi Islam thus bans any prayer to saints and dead loved ones, pilgrimages to tombs and special mosques, religious festivals celebrating saints, the honoring of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, and even prohibits the use of gravestones when burying the dead.

“Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated, he wrote. “

Abd al-Wahhab demanded conformity — a conformity that was to be demonstrated in physical and tangible ways. He argued that all Muslims must individually pledge their allegiance to a single Muslim leader (a Caliph, if there were one). Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated, he wrote. The list of apostates meriting death included the Shiite, Sufis and other Muslim denominations, whom Abd al-Wahhab did not consider to be Muslim at all.


There is nothing here that separates Wahhabism from ISIS. The rift would emerge only later: from the subsequent institutionalization of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s doctrine of “One Ruler, One Authority, One Mosque” — these three pillars being taken respectively to refer to the Saudi king, the absolute authority of official Wahhabism, and its control of “the word” (i.e. the mosque).


It is this rift — the ISIS denial of these three pillars on which the whole of Sunni authority presently rests — makes ISIS, which in all other respects conforms to Wahhabism, a deep threat to Saudi Arabia.


BRIEF HISTORY 1741- 1818


Abd al-Wahhab’s advocacy of these ultra radical views inevitably led to his expulsion from his own town — and in 1741, after some wanderings, he found refuge under the protection of Ibn Saud and his tribe. What Ibn Saud perceived in Abd al-Wahhab’s novel teaching was the means to overturn Arab tradition and convention. It was a path to seizing power.

“Their strategy — like that of ISIS today — was to bring the peoples whom they conquered into submission. They aimed to instill fear. “



Ibn Saud’s clan, seizing on Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine, now could do what they always did, which was raiding neighboring villages and robbing them of their possessions. Only now they were doing it not within the ambit of Arab tradition, but rather under the banner of jihad. Ibn Saud and Abd al-Wahhab also reintroduced the idea of martyrdom in the name of jihad, as it granted those martyred immediate entry into paradise.


In the beginning, they conquered a few local communities and imposed their rule over them. (The conquered inhabitants were given a limited choice: conversion to Wahhabism or death.) By 1790, the Alliance controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula and repeatedly raided Medina, Syria and Iraq.


Their strategy — like that of ISIS today — was to bring the peoples whom they conquered into submission. They aimed to instill fear. In 1801, the Allies attacked the Holy City of Karbala in Iraq. They massacred thousands of Shiites, including women and children. Many Shiite shrines were destroyed, including the shrine of Imam Hussein, the murdered grandson of Prophet Muhammad.


A British official, Lieutenant Francis Warden, observing the situation at the time, wrote: “They pillaged the whole of it [Karbala], and plundered the Tomb of Hussein... slaying in the course of the day, with circumstances of peculiar cruelty, above five thousand of the inhabitants ...”


Osman Ibn Bishr Najdi, the historian of the first Saudi state, wrote that Ibn Saud committed a massacre in Karbala in 1801. He proudly documented that massacre saying, “we took Karbala and slaughtered and took its people (as slaves), then praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and we do not apologize for that and say: ‘And to the unbelievers: the same treatment.’”


In 1803, Abdul Aziz then entered the Holy City of Mecca, which surrendered under the impact of terror and panic (the same fate was to befall Medina, too). Abd al-Wahhab’s followers demolished historical monuments and all the tombs and shrines in their midst. By the end, they had destroyed centuries of Islamic architecture near the Grand Mosque.


But in November of 1803, a Shiite assassin killed King Abdul Aziz (taking revenge for the massacre at Karbala). His son, Saud bin Abd al Aziz, succeeded him and continued the conquest of Arabia. Ottoman rulers, however, could no longer just sit back and watch as their empire was devoured piece by piece. In 1812, the Ottoman army, composed of Egyptians, pushed the Alliance out from Medina, Jeddah and Mecca. In 1814, Saud bin Abd al Aziz died of fever. His unfortunate son Abdullah bin Saud, however, was taken by the Ottomans to Istanbul, where he was gruesomely executed (a visitor to Istanbul reported seeing him having been humiliated in the streets of Istanbul for three days, then hanged and beheaded, his severed head fired from a canon, and his heart cut out and impaled on his body).


In 1815, Wahhabi forces were crushed by the Egyptians (acting on the Ottoman’s behalf) in a decisive battle. In 1818, the Ottomans captured and destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Dariyah. The first Saudi state was no more. The few remaining Wahhabis withdrew into the desert to regroup, and there they remained, quiescent for most of the 19th century.


HISTORY RETURNS WITH ISIS


It is not hard to understand how the founding of the Islamic State by ISIS in contemporary Iraq might resonate amongst those who recall this history. Indeed, the ethos of 18th century Wahhabism did not just wither in Nejd, but it roared back into life when the Ottoman Empire collapsed amongst the chaos of World War I.


The Al Saud — in this 20th century renaissance — were led by the laconic and politically astute Abd-al Aziz, who, on uniting the fractious Bedouin tribes, launched the Saudi “Ikhwan” in the spirit of Abd-al Wahhab’s and Ibn Saud’s earlier fighting proselytisers.


The Ikhwan was a reincarnation of the early, fierce, semi-independent vanguard movement of committed armed Wahhabist “moralists” who almost had succeeded in seizing Arabia by the early 1800s. In the same manner as earlier, the Ikhwan again succeeded in capturing Mecca, Medina and Jeddah between 1914 and 1926. Abd-al Aziz, however, began to feel his wider interests to be threatened by the revolutionary “Jacobinism” exhibited by the Ikhwan. The Ikhwan revolted — leading to a civil war that lasted until the 1930s, when the King had them put down: he machine-gunned them.


For this king, (Abd-al Aziz), the simple verities of previous decades were eroding. Oil was being discovered in the peninsular. Britain and America were courting Abd-al Aziz, but still were inclined to support Sharif Husain as the only legitimate ruler of Arabia. The Saudis needed to develop a more sophisticated diplomatic posture.


So Wahhabism was forcefully changed from a movement of revolutionary jihadand theological takfiri purification, to a movement of conservative social, political, theological, and religious da’wa (Islamic call) and to justifying the institution that upholds loyalty to the royal Saudi family and the King’s absolute power.


OIL WEALTH SPREAD WAHHABISM


With the advent of the oil bonanza — as the French scholar, Giles Kepel writes, Saudi goals were to “reach out and spread Wahhabism across the Muslim world ... to “Wahhabise” Islam, thereby reducing the “multitude of voices within the religion” to a “single creed” — a movement which would transcend national divisions. Billions of dollars were — and continue to be — invested in this manifestation of soft power.


It was this heady mix of billion dollar soft power projection — and the Saudi willingness to manage Sunni Islam both to further America’s interests, as it concomitantly embedded Wahhabism educationally, socially and culturally throughout the lands of Islam — that brought into being a western policy dependency on Saudi Arabia, a dependency that has endured since Abd-al Aziz’s meeting with Roosevelt on a U.S. warship (returning the president from the Yalta Conference) until today.


Westerners looked at the Kingdom and their gaze was taken by the wealth; by the apparent modernization; by the professed leadership of the Islamic world. They chose to presume that the Kingdom was bending to the imperatives of modern life — and that the management of Sunni Islam would bend the Kingdom, too, to modern life.

“On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahhabist. On the other hand, it is ultra radical in a different way. It could be seen essentially as a corrective movement to contemporary Wahhabism.”


But the Saudi Ikhwan approach to Islam did not die in the 1930s. It retreated, but it maintained its hold over parts of the system — hence the duality that we observe today in the Saudi attitude towards ISIS.
On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahhabist. On the other hand, it is ultra radical in a different way. It could be seen essentially as a corrective movement to contemporary Wahhabism.
ISIS is a “post-Medina” movement: it looks to the actions of the first two Caliphs, rather than the Prophet Muhammad himself, as a source of emulation, and it forcefully denies the Saudis’ claim of authority to rule.
As the Saudi monarchy blossomed in the oil age into an ever more inflated institution, the appeal of the Ikhwan message gained ground (despite King Faisal’s modernization campaign). The “Ikhwan approach” enjoyed — and still enjoys — the support of many prominent men and women and sheikhs. In a sense, Osama bin Laden was precisely the representative of a late flowering of this Ikhwani approach.
Today, ISIS’ undermining of the legitimacy of the King’s legitimacy is not seen to be problematic, but rather a return to the true origins of the Saudi-Wahhab project.
In the collaborative management of the region by the Saudis and the West in pursuit of the many western projects (countering socialism, Ba’athism, Nasserism, Soviet and Iranian influence), western politicians have highlighted their chosen reading of Saudi Arabia (wealth, modernization and influence), but they chose to ignore the Wahhabist impulse.
After all, the more radical Islamist movements were perceived by Western intelligence services as being more effective in toppling the USSR in Afghanistan — and in combatting out-of-favor Middle Eastern leaders and states.
Why should we be surprised then, that from Prince Bandar’s Saudi-Western mandate to manage the insurgency in Syria against President Assad should have emerged a neo-Ikhwan type of violent, fear-inducing vanguard movement: ISIS? And why should we be surprised — knowing a little about Wahhabism — that “moderate” insurgents in Syria would become rarer than a mythical unicorn? Why should we have imagined that radical Wahhabism would create moderates? Or why could we imagine that a doctrine of “One leader, One authority, One mosque: submit to it, or be killed” could ever ultimately lead to moderation or tolerance?
Or, perhaps, we never imagined.
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Wahhabism, ISIS, and the Saudi Connection

By U.S. Department of State from United States - Secretary Kerry Sits With Saudi King Salman Before Bilateral Meeting in Riyadh, Public Domain, $3

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The Saudi Wahhabis are the real foe



http://www.politico.eu/article/the-saudi-wahhabis-are-the-real-foe-islamic-terrorists-salafi-violence/
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Wahhabism and ISIS: why US officials won’t discuss their links to Saudi Arabia